1.What's The Difference Between Putin And Milosevic?  About 22 Years.

By Nenad Pejic, rfe

March 11, 2014

As I watch the news and images from Crimea, I can’t help but feel a sense of deja vu. It's as if I am reliving the 1992 break-up of Yugoslavia and the beginning of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

When Russia's propaganda machine claims the unmarked troops in Crimea are spontaneously organized self-defense forces comprising concerned citizens, I am reminded of similarly "self-organized" armed groups setting up barricades in Sarajevo in March 1992.

Just like in Crimea, these troops lacked recognizable insignia. What they did have were brand new Kalashnikovs, impeccably organized communication, and military discipline. The similarity is eerie and ominous for anyone who was in Sarajevo at that time.

What's the difference between Vladimir Putin and Slobodan Milosevic? About 22 years.

They are one man with two shadows; one modus operandi separated by a little more than two decades.

In fact, if Milosevic were alive today, he could probably sue Putin for plagiarism.

The Russian president calls the armed men in Crimea "volunteers" protecting the rights of ethnic Russians. In the 1990s, Milosevic used the exact same word to describe similar groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which he claimed were protecting ethnic Serbs.

Putin claims that Ukraine's sovereignty should be respected, even as he does everything in his power to undermine it. Likewise, Milosevic paid lip service to Bosnia's territorial integrity, while troops at his command worked to partition it and end its fledgling statehood.

Both leaders use religion to fuel their respective conflicts and justify intervention. Russian media recently reported -- incorrectly -- that the Monastery of the Caves in Kyiv had been damaged. Serbian media in 1992 likewise claimed -- inaccurately -- Serb churches and monasteries had been damaged.

Putin is testing the West's reaction and counting on divisions between Europe and the United States to hobble any coherent and coordinated response, just as Milosevic did 22 years ago.

The eerie similarities extend beyond Putin and Milosevic's rhetoric.

When demonstrators in Kyiv came under sniper fire, few from Bosnia could fail to recall April 6, 1992 -- the day demonstrators in Sarajevo came under sniper fire and the siege of the city began.

Russian media's coverage of the sniper attacks was also a cut-and-paste job from their Serbian counterparts two decades ago: citizens of Kyiv -- like those in Sarajevo -- were shooting at each other.

Russian media has also reported an alleged "refugee crisis," with some 650,000 pouring over the border into Russia. When the Bosnian war began, Serbian media also raised the alarm about refugees pouring over the border.

In both cases, the United Nations debunked the reports. But never mind.

Mobilizing To Hate

Both Serbian and Russian media also relied on false images to illustrate and bolster their claims. Russian media used footage of the heavily traveled border crossing between Poland and Ukraine. Serbian media in 1992 used actual footage of refugees fleeing -- it's just that they were running away from Milosevic’s forces.

The politically and emotionally loaded language Russian media has used to describe the new authorities in Kyiv, dubbing them "fascists" and "anti-Semites," is also reminiscent of Serbia's characterization of its opponents. Croats were characterized as "ustashi" and Bosniaks, or Bosnian Muslims, as "mujahadeen."

This is how wars begin. This is how societies are mobilized to hate. Ordinary citizens are subjected to fear and propaganda eventually eroding the trust in other ethnic groups, other nationalities.

In 1992 Serbs were led to believe that Milosevic was defending and saving their beleaguered nation by "gaining territories and conquering cities." LIkewise, recent polls show that a majority in Russia believe their military is saving Crimea's Russians by annexing the territory.

It is far easier to believe than to ask questions.

There is also an eerie similarity in Putin and Milosevic's respective paths to power.

Both were initially not elected. Putin was named prime minister in September 1999 by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who also dubbed him his chosen successor. When Yeltsin resigned months later, Putin became acting president.

Likewise, Milosevic's political rise began in 1986 when he was appointed head of the Serbian Communist Party.

The early tenure of each leader was marked by exploitation of an ethnic conflict: in Milosevic's case, Kosovo; in Putin's, Chechnya.

Both established pseudo democracies with tightly controlled state media and fake opposition parties. Both bolstered their legitimacy with mass, "spontaneous" pro-regime rallies. Both used "patriotic" youth organizations -- the "young Socialists" for Milosevic and "Nashi" for Putin -- to harass opponents.

Putin and Milosevic both also ruled societies in which institutions were weak, corruption rife, the rule of law absent, and the security services politically empowered.

But while the parallels between Putin and Milosevic are undeniable, this does not necessarily extend to the way their respective stories will end.

Milosevic was able to pursue his military adventures for "only" eight years, before NATO united against him in Kosovo in 1999 and he was overthrown by a popular revolution a year later.

But Putin enjoys an advantage that Milosevic lacked. Russia, unlike Serbia, is a major geopolitical player with a seat on the UN Security Council, a nuclear power, and a crucial supplier of energy to Europe.

If, without assets like these, Milosevic managed to menace his neighbors for eight years, how long will Putin be able to do so?

 http://www.rferl.org/content/whats-the-difference-between-putin-and-milosevic-about-22-years/25293610.html

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COMMENT: Some political analysts wrongly compare Russian invasion in Crimea with NATO intervention in Kosovo. The difference is that Serbian army started ethnic cleansing and genocide of the ethnic Albanians. Therefore, the intervention in Kosovo was justified by the UN Convention of the prevention of genocide. Recall that Serbs already committed genocide and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, before they invaded autonomous region of Kosovo.

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2. Could Crimea be another Bosnia?

By GERARD TOAL, opendemocracy

14 March 2014

'A democratic reply to undemocratic pressures.’ This is how Radovan Karadžic's party characterised the referendum it organised in Bosnia in November 1991. The anti-democratic measure, as they saw it, was the majority vote by the then Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina declaring Bosnia a sovereign republic within its existing borders. Karadžic had a legal case for lodging a complaint against this vote but instead his party upped the ante, abandoned the Assembly and organised a mono-ethnic referendum outside the existing legal structures of the republic. In this, ethnic Serb voters were asked if they wanted Socialist Bosnia to remain within the then Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or not. Non-Serb Bosnians could, in theory, also vote but on separate, differently coloured ballot papers. Few bothered.

The terms and legacy of Karadžic’s ploy in November 1991 are worth recalling as another referendum gambit plays itself out this weekend in Crimea. The essential formula for modern day secessionism is as follows:

(i) assert a claim of victimhood as a result of outrageous acts perpetrated by an oppressor;

(ii) represent one’s own acts as a ‘legitimate response’ to the oppressor’s acts. Here a self-organised referendum is desirable because it appears democratic;  

(iii) proclaim, thereafter, in a local assembly, a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) based on a ‘right to self-determination.’

While the formula is fairly clear, the details and improvisations around it matter a great deal in assessing legitimacy. The interstate system and international law are, as a rule, strongly opposed to secessionism. But the empirical circumstances of oppression and response do matter. Karadžic’s party’s claim of victimhood at the hands of Croatian ‘fascists’ and ‘Muslim fundamentalists’ was, for example, based on political hysteria, not hard evidence of oppression. Neighbouring Serbian strongman Slobodan Miloševic facilitated Karadžic’s ‘democratic reply’ and it became the self-legitimating justification for Karadžic to proclaim a Serbian Republic within Bosnia-Herzegovina. This move pre-emptively sabotaged an internationally sanctioned referendum on Bosnia’s independence in the spring of 1992. At the very moment Bosnia was acquiring recognition as an independent state, it came under attack by those who viewed it an ‘artificial country.’  Horrific war crimes and acts of genocide followed, in Bosnia and later in Kosovo. It was the latter, following on from years of oppression, which finally precipitated NATO intervention, international occupation, stalemated negotiations and, in the end, a UDI by Kosovo’s democratically elected leadership. That so many states chose to recognize Kosovo is a mark of the persuasiveness of ‘remedial secession’ as a doctrine in the Kosovo case, and the government’s ‘earned sovereignty’ over nearly a decade.

Bosnia then, Ukraine now

The crisis in Ukraine over Crimea has uncomfortable echoes of the long dissolution of Yugoslavia. Though Ukraine has been a recognised independent state for over twenty years, Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly regards it as a ‘cobbled together country.’ Even more blatantly than Miloševic, he has intervened with Russian military forces to pre-emptively protect the local ethnic Russian population from a supposed ‘fascist’ threat (though there is no evidence of ethnicised violence). Sponsoring a local strongman as the new prime minister of Crimea, Russian forces have engineered an extra-legal referendum on 16 March, to give a democratic imprimatur to Russia acquiring Crimea.

Like Karadžic’s gambit, the move is deeply polarising, exploiting local ethnic factors to serve a larger geopolitical goal. While ethnic Russians are a majority in Crimea, not all necessarily see themselves as pro-Russia and anti-Ukraine. Russian ethnicity and language primacy does not mean dis-identification with Ukraine. The Russian invasion and referendum, however, is forcing a binary choice on residents, a choice depicted in stark terms on at least one referendum poster as one between Russia and Nazism. Crimean Tatar leaders, recognizing the geopolitical coercion behind an ostensibly democratic procedure, are calling for a boycott of the referendum.

It is unclear what will happen if the Crimea referendum goes ahead as planned. Two status options are possible, should, as is expected, those who vote repudiate Ukraine. The first is the choice presented on the current ballot, namely that Crimea be ‘re-united with Russia as part of the Russian Federation.’ The ‘re-united’ frame primes voters to view Crimea as natural Russian territory, as if a nostalgic past overrules and negates the present. The Russian Federation has to officially accede to this outcome. Should this not happen immediately, Crimea may join the ranks of post-Soviet de facto states.

Will Putin take Crimea?

Public opinion surveys my colleagues and I have conducted over the last few years in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia reveal residual Russian residents in these territories to be deeply regretful about the collapse of the Soviet Union, trusting of the Russian leadership, and supportive of local Russian troop presences. Only amongst ethnic Abkhazians , and Georgians in Abkhazia, is there an aspiration for a future other than integration into the Russian Federation. In the past, Russia has wisely refrained from openly flouting international law by annexing these, de jure respectively Moldovan and Georgian, territories. If it takes Crimea from Ukraine, however, we are in a new era.

The Bosnian precedent does not bode well for the future in and beyond Crimea. It is delusional to believe that countries can be dismembered without the use of violence. Making Republika Srpska a material reality within  the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina inaugurated waves of ethnic cleansing across the country and a new political economy based on violence, theft and ethno-party rule. As a founding father, Karadžic grew rich from criminal accumulation and war crimes. Weekend warriors from Serbia descended upon Bosnian homes, looting, pillaging and killing. Before the war there were no ‘Serb territories’ in Bosnia, just as there are no ‘Russian territories’ in Southern and Eastern Ukraine. But during the war the unleashing of gangs with guns destroyed the idea of Bosnia as a multiethnic and multicultural country. This is the nightmare facing certain regions of Ukraine. It could begin in Crimea this Sunday. Let’s hope crisis diplomacy stops this speeding train before it is too late.

 http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/gerard-toal/could-crimea-be-another-bosnia-republika-srpska-krajina

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COMMENT: This is one of the best articles written by somebody who is not from Bosnia, i.e. who is not an insider. The following letter by Dr. Muhamed Borogovac to late US Senator Edward Kennedy in 2004  explains how deeply USA betrayed Bosnia, and international law.  That paved the way for the invasion of Crimea.

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3. WHAT USA HAVE DONE IN BOSNIA

Mr. Senator,

As you know the war in Bosnia ended 1995 in Dayton, when Richard Holbrook worked out a dishonest fraud against Bosnian people, the victims of aggression. He appeased the aggressors, and gave half of Bosnia to Serbian rebels. Mr. Holbrook helped creation of Serbian state on the ethnically cleansed territories, "Republic Srpska". The aggressors were rewarded by half of the victims' country, contrary to international law. The worse crime was committed by American lawyer Holbrook, than by Serbs. It is not excuse for Holbrook that Bosnian President cooperated in that illegal proposal to divide a country, a victim of aggression.

Let me remind you, the Dayton agreement rewarded the aggressor's side by giving them also veto power on all decisions of Bosnian Government. Only formally, Bosnia is still one country. The purpose of keeping Bosnia formally one country is merely to trick both American and Bosnian people to accept Dayton. American people asked American politicians to do something for Bosnia, not against Bosnia, according to numerous Congress resolutions during the aggression against Bosnia.

Now, 9 years after the war, Bosnia does not function normally, even the major railroads don't work. Nothing works in Bosnia because of the creation of Republic Srpska, with veto power.

Many Bosnians were stripped of their property. The American administration in Bosnia took part in that activity, in order to enforce the Dayton agreement.

In order to prove that Dayton is a legalization of robbery, let me explain the pre war Bosnian (Yugoslav) economic system.

Namely, in the beginning of communism in Yugoslavia, the factories were property of the country. Josip Broz Tito noticed early that it does not work. In the seventies Tito made reforms. He privatized factories (all real assets) by giving them to their employees. In the 1980's, after Tito died, Markovic the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, made the next step in the privatization, by issuing shares to workers of the businesses. That was the most successful privatization in eastern Europe.

Many powerful corporations were created before the war in Bosnia. Let us take "Energoinvest" as an example. The question is: Who is the owner of the factory that before the war belonged to Energoinvest corporation, if that factory is on a location in the Republic Srpska, after the Daytonpartition of Bosnia? For corporate America, the answer is clear: The Energoinvest factories remain property of Energoinvest, even though they are in the locations in the Republic Srpska. However, in the post Dayton Bosnia, all corporate property was illegally converted to state property. The real owners were stripped of their assets so that Milosevic's cronies in Bosnia would be appeased. That was a step backward to an early communism, when the state was owner of all assets, before the Tito privatized all real assets giving them to workers. After that the new and  criminal privatization has been done by former warlords, the new ruling class in Bosnia.

Dear Mr. Senator, I know that this is the South Shore Chamber of Commerce, and that we should talk about corporate America. However, I decided to mention this injustice which is far away from America, but a big scar in American politics. I know of you as somebody who helps all disfranchised people. I hope you will initiate a Congressional investigation to see why the injustice has been done, why USA took part in the crime in Bosnia, and what can be done to bring justice to victims of Bosnian genocide. And remember, we do not ask for humanitarian aid, we ask for justice and unification of our country.

Dr. Muhamed Borogovac

Bosnian Congress, USA