Mladiceva presuda nekompletna, Presuda Herceg-Bosni kompletna

National Congress of The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (NCR B&H) ONLINE NEWSLETTER International, No. 959 December 7, 2017 CONTENT: 1. Miscarriage of Justice at the ICTY: Bosnians consider guilty genocide verdict for Mladic incomplete 1.1 The definition of the genocide is clear, simple and well intended 1.2 Genocide is very well documented in the Mladic judgment 1.3 The court setting its own definition of the genocide 1.4 The consequences of the new definition of genocide 2. Opis metodologije ICTY-a i konzekvence takve metodologije kojom se prakticno mijenja defincija genocida 3. ICTY je profesionalno obavio posao u sudjenju Udruzenom zlocinackom poduhvatu Herceg-Bosna 4. Veliki uspjeh knjige “The War in Bosnia: How to Succeed at Genocide” ──────────── 1. Miscarriage of Justice at the ICTY: Bosnians consider guilty genocide verdict for Mladic incomplete By Tarik Borogovac, Bosnian Congress USA 1.1 The definition of the genocide is clear, simple and well intended In Bosnia and Herzegovina the Mladic decision, as the previous decisions at the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY), is seen as incomplete and a major miscarriage of justice. That may sound odd: Mladic was proclaimed guilty of genocide carried out by the army that he commanded, and he was sentenced to life in prison. How can it be miscarriage of justice? Two reasons: First, Mladic's mission to establish an ethnically clean "Republic of the Serbs" (RS) is alive and well. The establishment of the RS was the successful main goal of the Joint criminal enterprise, (JCE). Today it is both a symbol of genocide while also continuing its humiliation of the victims through governing their hometowns, setting school curricula that denies students' identity and history, flying its flag on sacred ground of Srebrenica and other massacred Bosnian towns. While the RS exists, the ICTY trials of a few ring-leaders and ideologues is fake justice because the punishment is their own, and it exempts and protects the RS government that committed these acts. The second reason, on which we will spend the rest of this column, is the verdict regarding Claim (I) of the indictment, relating to six towns other than Srebrenica. The decision (and previous ones on Bosnia specifically) uses very odd twists of logic in a strange effort to find reasons why these towns might be different from Srebrenica. And their logic does not stand up to basic scrutiny because there is no fundamental difference. It completely weakens the definition of genocide, to an extent that many future genocides will not be punished as such. Let us remind ourselves how genocide is defined (from the convention on genocide -- http://preventgenocide.org/law/convention/text.htm) Article II: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. Note this definition clearly is meant to prevent hairsplitting about what is genocide. The word "intent" is used to make clear that you do not have to be very successful in carrying it out to make it genocide, and "in part" means that you do not have to even desire to kill every single group member, as killing some of them for mere reason of being members of the group is genocide. Even non-murderous acts qualify -- e.g. part (d) makes clear that forcing sterilization or abortions of folks for the reason of being members of the group qualifies. There is also no mention of victims being very special or emblematic members of the targeted group -- it is genocide even with (especially with) regular people because the motive is merely based on the ethnic, religious, or racial membership of the victim. 1.2 The genocide is pretty well documented in the judgment Everyone should read the decision or at least any random part of it, as it is very long. Everyone, from schoolchildren to genocide deniers should read it for the power of the evidence. In page after page, for thousands of pages, it shows us what genocide looks like when carried out. Dispassionately, just stating the facts, it documents statements by the JCE leaders, including Mladic, that threaten to exterminate Bosniaks. It documents killings and brutal violence against large numbers of Bosniak civilians -- giving times and locations of the acts, names of victims and their killers, the methods used to commit the murders. It is not exhaustive, it does not include every killing in every town, as that would not be feasible to do. But there are very many examples from different towns -- more than enough to show the pattern. Just as a sampling of this, let us review a chilling section of summaries of mass murder (omitting mass rapes, beatings detentions, etc.) of Bosniaks carried out by people identified as Serbian military and paramilitary members, motivated by ethnicity. Foca: 46 Bosnian Muslims as well as hundreds of predominantly Bosnian-Muslim detainees at KP Dom Foca (prison) were killed Kljuc: at least 266 Bosnian Muslims were killed and that those killings constituted murder. Kotor Varoš: at least 185 Bosnian Muslims were killed and that those killings constituted murder. Prijedor: at least 993 Bosnian Muslims as well as at least 536 Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats were killed and that those killings constituted murder. Sanski Most: at least 94 Bosnian Muslims and 9 Bosnian Croats were killed and that those killings constituted murder. Vlasenica: at least 169 Bosnian Muslims were killed and that those killings constituted murder. A technical note: ICTY refers to Bosniaks as "Bosnian Muslims" because Yugoslavia officially used the name "Muslims by Nationality" to deny their Bosniak identity. Bosniaks were called Turks by Serb nationalist leadership, inciting Serb people toward historic score-settling. Notice the words "at least" attached to the figures above. These figures represent only the confirmed victims known to be tied to specific physical perpetrators as part of the specific massacres, just as we know there were many, many more dead in these areas. For example, estimates of numbers murdered in Prijedor during the war, a town taken over without resistance early in the war, are more than double what is listed above. Note also, that these are not all of the towns where such ethnically based mass murders occurred. For example, Visegrad, Zvornik, Bijeljina, Brcko, etc. are well known sites of such massacres that fit this pattern but were excluded from Claim 1 by the prosecution, for all kinds of technical or practical reasons. Srebrenica was included, but kept as a separate charge of genocide with a "guilty" verdict. 1.3 The court sets their own definition of the genocide Clearly, after seeing just these massacres that are included, for which it is shown in the judgment that the physical perpetrators were uniformed members of Serb forces and of organized Serb paramilitaries operating in view and in cooperation with Serb forces, and establishing that those perpetrators were motivated by the ethnicity of the victims, the ICTY still declines to call it genocide for these towns. That is baffling. The text of the decision for Claim 1 gives the reason, quote from the judgement: ...the Trial Chamber finds that the Bosnian Muslims in Sanski Most, Vlasenica, Foca, Kotor Varoš, and Prijedor Municipalities were targeted by the physical perpetrators of prohibited acts largely in their own respective municipalities. The Trial Chamber notes that the physical perpetrators had limited geographical control or authority to carry out activities. The Bosnian Muslims targeted in each individual municipality formed a relatively small part of the Bosnian-Muslim population in the Bosnian-Serb claimed territory or in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole. The Trial Chamber received insufficient evidence in dictating why the Bosnian Muslims in each of the above municipalities or the municipalities themselves had a special significance or were emblematic in relation to the protected group as a whole. The Trial Chamber is, therefore, not satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the surrounding facts and circumstances is that the physical perpetrators possessed the intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslims in Sanski Most, Foca, Kotor Varoš, Prijedor, and Vlasenica Municipalities as a substantial part of the protected group. In conclusion, the Trial Chamber does not find, beyond reasonable doubt, that the physical perpetrators of prohibited acts against the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the Count 1 municipalities committed those prohibited acts, with the intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats as a substantial part of the protected groups in Bosnian-Herzegovina. - the end of the quote Therefore, the following illogical tests are imposed: (A) Do the physical perpetrators stay in one town or go to other towns? That is possibly a practical decision on the part of the Serb military leadership. If you intend to commit genocide, and your victims are many and live over a large territory, you have to divide and delegate the task anyway. So, you may decide to keep groups of killers in smaller locations, preferably locals who know who is a member of the group you are targeting (in Bosnia, ethnicity is not apparent from seeing or speaking with someone). As for the physical perpetrators themselves, even if their intent is to kill all Bosniaks everywhere, they would not be tempted to leave their town at all, as long as they believe that other perpetrators will massacre those other towns. Given that the killing was so widespread, that would be a logical assumption for them. Beyond that, the fact that so many different groups of low-level butchers went on similar rampage in so many different locations makes it implausible that they were not either encouraged, incited or ordered by their higher level leadership. Else, how do they all get the same ideas and work in similar ways independently? And why did they all conclude they can carry out these acts with impunity? Apparently they could because they were not stopped or punished by the RS leadership, as the massacres lasted over long periods of time in those towns and recurred in other towns all throughout the war. Going forward, does this not provide a recipe of how to do genocide properly: just keep your low-level killers in smaller groups, and assign to each a single location to terrorize. In that way the practical organizational strategy has the benefit of protecting you legally. (B) Are the people murdered (rather than intended) within each town ofspecial significance (or emblematic) of Bosniaks? This rule was established only in the case of Bosnia, to separate Srebrenica from other towns. In the eyes of the perpetrators the victims in Srebrenica were the same people as the victims in Prijedor and other towns, and killed for the same reason -- they were Bosniaks ("Turks"). That was their significance. Denoting Srebrenicans as especially significant or emblematic beyond others is circular logic, as they only became emblematic of the Bosniak plight because their fate and genocide was so visible, as they were in a UN safe-zone and had been under siege for a long time, and because their massacre was expected and anticipated, due to the earlier massacres in the other towns. The victims in the other towns are not special because they were first, they were taken from their homes in the middle of the night, and their fates were not known until sometime after the fact. One can define significance in better ways than the ICTY did. Many of the Bosniaks targeted first in many towns occupied by Serb forces were prominent in their communities for being political leaders, intellectuals, religious clerics (Imams), businessmen, lawyers and teachers. This was decapitation of Bosniak communities in those towns, and in all of Bosnia. For example, Serb forces executed Deputy Prime Minister Hakija Turajlic at a checkpoint outside of Sarajevo when he was in a UN vehicle. Such people are most emblematic of an ethnic group. The particular fake contrast chosen makes it seem the court is desperately searching for any argument to separate Srebrenica from other massacres. (C) Are the people actually murdered (rather than intended) within each town a large enough part of the protected group within that town? Clearly, the numbers listed above are large, but the ICTY simply chooses to set a threshold (an arbitrary and unclear one) at some higher number. Recall, the definition of genocide implies there is no such threshold by using the words "in part" and "intent". With this threshold, the ICTY is also setting an implicit guideline for carrying out genocide in the future: they should murder about 1500 in each town the size of Prijedor and make sure they do not get near 8000 in a town the size of Srebrenica. (D) Are the people actually murdered (rather than intended) a significant part or the protected group in the occupied territory and the country as a whole? That is absurd, because it gives credit to the perpetrators for inability to exterminate people who were simply out of their reach. It gives them credit for those (majority) of Bosniaks from these towns who did not wait around to be rounded up and slaughtered, the ones who took a look at what was happening and decided to escape. Countless Bosniak refugees managed to escape from these territories and ended up in free territories and in other countries during the war. It gives the perpetrators credit even for the large majority of Bosnia's 2 million Bosniaks who had lived in the territories that the Serb forces never managed to occupy -- such as Tuzla, Sarajevo, Bihac, Zenica, etc. The artificial segmentation to individual towns and massacres also simply makes it impossible to mathematically ever meet test (D). To guarantee that no piece is sufficient by itself, all you have to do is to segment to small enough pieces. 1.4 The consequences of the new definition of genocide In total, the ICTY managed to avoid making the obvious conclusion that all of occupied Bosnia was subject to genocide by making a series of decisions that individually defied logic, and built them upon each other like a house of cards: It eliminated many of the deaths by not considering many towns and locations where massacres occurred. Within the towns that it did consider, it did not account for all the massacres as being part of the pattern, just subsets where it could not find any uncertainty about any given aspect. It focused on the numbers of actually murdered, rather than the stated and demonstrated intent, giving the perpetrators credit for the difficulty of their task and their ineffectiveness and inability to carry it out fully, and credit for not murdering those they could not reach. It imposed an arbitrary and opaque threshold for a number that would be a significant enough part. It considered small towns separately, so that no town by itself would be considered as a significant to all of Bosnia according to that arbitrary threshold. And in the case of Srebrenica, which was known to everybody as symbolic of the whole genocide, and could therefore not be avoided, the court said that its symbolism made it a special case, and used that assertion as a basis to differentiate and separate it from the others, and in turn used that as a basis to dismiss the fundamental similarities in facts that the others shared with Srebrenica. Murder is an act against an individual, and even mass murder is an act against a series of individuals. Each one has to be proven. But genocide as defined above is different, it is a single collective crime, committed against a group of people, by an organization, a movement adhering to an ideology, or a state. All these massacres occurred in the same war, within a short time span (three years) and in a small country about 300 km from end to end. The perpetrators all followed the same ideology, all were part of forces fighting on the same side, on territory occupied by the "Republic of the Serbs". If genocide is so difficult to establish in a single location, the fact that its pattern is co-occurring in so many other locations nearby is evidence that strengthens the case for them all. The common patterns between Prijedor, Sanski Most, Foca, Kljuc, etc. remove any basis for doubt in the individual towns. Srebrenica also is not a separate event from the other towns. Protection from genocide for members of a targeted group should not stop at a town line, it should extend to all places within the reach of the perpetrators. And the culpability of those perpetrators and their supporters should not be subject to hairsplitting. ──────────── 2. Opis metodologije ICTY-a i konzekvence takve metodologije kojom se prakticno mijenja defincija genocida Tarik Borogovac U totalu, internacionalni kriminalni tribunal za bivsu Jugoslaviju (ICTY) je uspio da izbjegne ocigledan zakljucak da je cijela okupirana teritorija BiH bila izlozena genocidu tako sto je donio niz odluka koje su svaka za sebe potpuno nelogicne, pa je onda od njih napravio kucu od karata. Prvo je iskljucio iz razmatranja mnoga naselja i lokacije gdje su se masakri dogadjali, i tako odmah na pocetku izbacio iz razmatranja o genocida mnoga ubistva. Zatim, u opstinama koje jeste razmatrao, sud nije razmatrao mnoge masakre koji su pocinjeni, ali nisu mogli biti apsolutno istrazeni do zadnjeg detalja. Zatim su se fokusirali samo na brojeve ubijenih, i to brojeve koje su tom metodologijom voeoma umanjili, umjesto da su se fokusirali na dokazivanje genocidne namjere, koja je vidljiva sa obzirom na tipican “modus operandi”. Podsjecamo, po definciji genocida, dovoljno je bilo dokazati genocidnu namjeru i istrebljenje jednog dijela ciljane grupe, http://preventgenocide.org/law/convention/text.htm Takvom metodologijom je apsurdno Sud zlocincima upisao u kredit i to sto su se neke od potencijalih zrtava spasile bjezanjem sa okupirane teritorije, pa nisu usli u saldo ubijenih. Time je uvedena potpuno proizvoljna i nejasna granica do kojeg broja je dozvoljeno ubijanje neke etnicke grupe, a da to ne bude okarakterisano kao genocid. I sto je potpuno apsurdno, tom metodologijom je posmatrano DA LI BI BROJ UBIJENIH U SVAKOM GRADU POJEDINACNO BIO ZNACAJAN U ODNOSU NA CIJELU BiH, tj. da li je presao tu proizvoljnu granicu kada se moze smatrati genocidom. A u slucaju Srebrenice, koja je poznata po genocidu i za koju nisu mogli izbjeci donosenje presude za genocid, sud je naveo da je narod Srebrenice poseban i simbolizuje sve Bosnjake (valjda zato sto je pocinjen genocid) i upravo ta posebnost izdvaja od ostalih opstina, i tako je Sud iskljucio iz razmatranja slicnost metodologije provodjenja zlocina u Srebrenici sa drugim opstinama?! Znaci kruzna “logika” (circulus viciozus). Ubistvo je akt protiv individue i cak je masovno ubistvo akt protiv niza individua. Zato svako ubistvo posebno mora biti dokazano. Ali genocid, prema definciji genocida, je jedinstven zlocin pocinjen nad kolektivom, na pripadnicima jedne etnicke ili religijske grupe, zato sto su pripadnici te grupe. I pocinjen od strane kolektiva: organizacije ili pokreta koji se napaja jednom ideologijom, ili ga je pocinila jedna drzava. Svi bosanski masakri su pocinjeni u istom ratu, u kraktom priodu od tri godine, u maloj drzavi, oko 300 kilometara dugackoj s kraja na kraj. Svi izvrsioci su slijedili istu ideologiju, svi su pripadali vojnim jedinicama koje su se borile na istoj strani, na tritoriju paradrzave koju su formirali i nazvali Republika srpska. Ako je genocid tako tesko dokazati u jednoj opstini, cinjenica da se identicna metodologija (Americki policijaci kazu “common pattern” ili “Modus Operandi”, MO) ponavlja u drugim opstinama dokazuje da se radi o jednom zlocinackom poduhvatu u svim opstinama. Zajednicki “Modus Operandi” zlocinackog djelovanja u Prijedoru, Sanskom Mostu, Foci, Kljucu itd. uklanja svaku sumnju da se radi o genocidu u svim tim gradovima. Postavlja se pitaje, zasto su sudije odlucile da svaku opstinu gledaju kao poseban slucaj, te su tako onemogucili da isti Modus Operandi iz razlicitih opstina bude iskoristen kao mocan dokaz udruzenog poduhvata i genocidne namjere? Genocid u Srebrenici takodjer nije odvojen dogadjaj od svih drugih gradova. Zastita po konvenciji o genocidu se ne moze atomizirati po pojedinim gradovima, ona se pruza gdje god bi zlocinacka ruka mogla dosegnuti. Odogovrnost zlocinaca i njihovih simpatizera ne bi smjela biti zrtva ovakvog “cijepanja dlake”, tj. cijepanja jednoga zlocina genocida u vise manjih zlocina da bi se umanjila odgovornost mentora cijelog zlocinackog poduhvata. ──────────── 3. ICTY je profesionalno obavio posao u sudjenju Udruzenom zlocinackom poduhvatu Herceg-Bosna Muhamed Borogovac 4. ICTY je profesionalno obavio posao u sudjenju Udruzenom zlocinackom poduhvatu Herceg-Bosna Muhamed Borogovac Kao sto je poznato Sud je potvrdio sve kazne setorki prvaka Herceg-Bosne, implicirajuci pri tome i pokojne Franju Tudjmana i Gojka Suska, i sto je najvaznije i Republiku Hrvatsku. Za razliku od sudjenja Mladicu i Karadzicu, ovaj put Sud potpuno ispravno nije jedan zlocinacki poduhvat razbio na niz manjih opstinskih zlocina. I ne samo to, Sud je potpuno ispravno, bas kao i u Nirenbergu, na jednom sudjenju sudio cijeloj garnturi njihove tvorevine Herceg-Bosne, a ne pojedinacno svakom zlocincu na posebnom sudjenju. Vrhunac je dostignut kada je Tudjmanov "general" Slobodan Praljak teatralno popio otrov u sudnci. To je visestruko povecalo ineteres svjetkih medija za sestorku, i za sta su oni osudjeni. Istu noc sam gledao dva americka "World News" programa, ABC od 6:30 i BBC od 7:00. To su nesto kao nasi nekadasnji vecernji TV dnevnici. Oba su imala velike reporataze o zlocinima HVO-a u Bosni, sa snimkama iz Mostara, nocnim slikama protjerivanih civila preko starog mosta, rusenje starog mosta, i svim mukama kojima su Mostarci bili izlozeni. Nastupao je i jedan svjedok sa sudjenja sestorki, bivsi dopisnik BBC-a iz Mostara. Ukratko, mnogo vise prostora je dato ovoj presudi, nego presudi Mladicu, vjerovatno upravo zato sto je Praljak na sudjenju popio otrov, te je to znacajno doprinjelo povecanom interesu svjetske jevnosti. Ova presuda nama daje moralnu snagu da nikada ne pristanemo na treci entitet, tj. na vaskrsnuce Herceg-Bosne. Mislim da se nikoji izdajnici vise nece usuditi da dignu svoje prljave ruke kojima ce glasati za promjene ustava po volji HDZ-a, i da nam vise ne mogu lagati u oci i govoriti "Svijet hoce Herceg-Bonsu.", ako ju je taj isti svijet osudio kao zlocinacki poduhvat. Zato sada zaista imamo sansu da spasmo BiH i da spasimo Bosnjake od sudbine Palestinaca, a ta sudbina bi nas snasla ako ikada bude osnovan treci entitet u bilo kojoj formi. Pri tome se ne smijemo okliznuti ni na drugoj strani, moramo zaustaviti nase izdajnike i u njihovim dogovorima sa Srbijom, prije svega ne smijemo dozvoliti da se pregovara o granicama BiH, jer jednom kada se otvore granice BiH za pregovore, onda se to nece zaustaviti na "manjim korekcijama" kako nam to sada prodaju. Niakada nam se vise ne smije dogoditi da povjerujemo glumi jednog Bakira Izetbegovica. I on je kao i njegov otac izuzetno dobar glumac. Na primjer, cak sam i ja bio sklon da povjerujem da on istinski zeli reviziju presude za genocid BiH protiv Srbije na Internacionalnom sudu pravde (ICJ) kako je veoma dobro obrazlagao zahtjev za revizijom u "svadjama" sa Ivanicem. Tek kasnije smo od Nevenke Tromp i Jefrey-a Nice-a saznali da je on javio agentu BiH, jedinom covjeku iz BiH sa ovlastenom da komunicira sa Internacionalnim sudom pravde, da preda Ivanicevo pismo Sudu. Time je Ivanicevom pismu data snaga usaglasenog drzavnog dokumenta, te je to bio kraj procesa pocetog 1992 od strane Prof Boylea. Za novi proces je trebalo dobiti saglasnost Ivanica i Covica. Dakle, Izetbegovic je propustanjem Ivanicevog pisma sahranio Reviziju presude za genocid na najvaznijem sudu, a sjetimo se kako se izvanredno argumentovano tukao sa Ivanicem (tj. glumio) za vec mrtvu Reviziju, sto mi tada nismo znali. ──────────── 4. Veliki uspjeh knjige “The War in Bosnia: How to Succeed at Genocide” Knjiga “The War in Bosnia: How to Succeed at Genocide”, autora Muhameda Borogovca je u posljednjih nekoliko sedmica, zahvaljujuci povecanom interesu za BiH uzrokovanom novembarskim presudama Mladicu i Udruzenom zlocinackom poduhvatu Herceg-Bosna izbila na prvo mjesto Amazonove liste knjiga o Ratu u BiH. Podsjecamo, tu smo knjigu preveli na Engleski i objavili radi onih mladih Bosnjaka koji su raseljeni prije 25 godina iz domovine i sada bolje govore Engleski nego Bosanski. Zelimo da i oni znaju istinu o tome ko je odgovoran da su oni gotovo izgubili svoju domovinu. Slijedi link do Amazonove liste knjiga o ratu u BiH, i poslije toga kratka informacija o knjizi na Engleksom namijenjena upravo onim mladim Bosnjacima kojima je namijenjena i knjiga. https://www.amazon.com/s/?ie=UTF8&keywords=war+in+bosnia&tag=googhydr-20&index=aps&hvadid=198216555484&hvpos=1o1&hvnetw=g&hvrand=7796928925512672046&hvpone&hvptwo&hvqmt=e&hvdev=c&hvdvcmdl&hvlocint&hvlocphy=9001947&hvtargid=kwd-314767678500&ref=pd_sl_fglsbhjm9_e The book, “The War in Bosnia: How to Succeed at Genocide” by Muhamed Borogovac is the only book in English written by Bosnians about political scheming that enabled the war and genocide in Bosnia and produced the Dayton agreement. In other words, that is the only book about the big picture of the war as seen from the Bosnian perspective. It is a collection of political analyses written during the war and right after the war, by Bosnian intellectuals, insiders, dissidents from the Bosnian government who took part in the division of the country along the ethnic lines. The renewed interest for Bosnia, due to the November judgements at the ICTY pushed the book on top of the Amazon charts of book about the War in Bosnia. The book was issued in Bosnian, first time before the end of the war. Because authors predicted the great deal of what will happen in the future, the book became very popular among Bonsians, even though the book was very critical of Bosnian leadership for negotiating with and collaborating with the aggressors. The book owes its success to the fact that its predictions were correct, which indicates that authors understand very well what was really going on in Bosnia, which was very different form the picture presented to the world.